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1Authorized Keyword Search over Outsourced
Encrypted Data in Cloud Environment
Nazatul Haque Sultan, Student Member, IEEE, Nesrine Kaaniche, Member, IEEE,
Maryline Laurent, Member, IEEE, and Ferdous Ahmed Barbhuiya, Member, IEEE
Abstract—For better data availability and accessibility while ensuring data secrecy, end-users often tend to outsource their data to the
cloud servers in an encrypted form. However, this brings a major challenge to perform the search for some keywords over encrypted
content without disclosing any information to unintended entities. This paper proposes a novel expressive authorized keyword search
scheme relying on the concept of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. The originality of the proposed scheme is multifold. First,
it supports the generic and convenient multi-owner and multi-user scenario, where the encrypted data are outsourced by several data
owners and searchable by multiple users. Second, the formal security analysis proves that the proposed scheme is semantically
secure against chosen keyword and outsiders keyword guessing attacks. Third, an interactive protocol is introduced which avoids the
need of any secure-channels between users and service provider. Fourth, due to the concept of bilinear-map accumulator, the system
can efficiently revoke users and/or their attributes, and authenticate them prior to launching any expensive search operations. Fifth,
conjunctive keyword search is provided thus enabling to search for multiple keywords simultaneously, with minimal cost. Sixth, the
performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme outperforms closely-related works.
Index Terms—keyword search, conjunctive keyword search, searchable encryption, attribute-based encryption, user revocation,
keyword guessing attack.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH ever increasing popularity of cloud comput-ing, cloud users are outsourcing their data to cloud
servers. This enables the cloud users, i.e. individuals/ orga-
nizations, to take the advantages offered by cloud comput-
ing such as on demand service, low investment cost, ubiquitous
and flexible access [1]. Usually, the data are outsourced to the
remote cloud servers, also known as cloud storage servers.
These servers are hosted by a third-party service-provider
popularity named as Cloud Service Provider (CSP). As the
outsourced data are getting out of the perimeter of data
owners (who own the data) while going under full control of
the CSP, the data owners (Owners) have to rely on the CSP
for safekeeping of those data. However, the outsourced data
may contain sensitive information, such as medical health
records, financial documents, personal photographs, etc.,
which the CSP may illegally access for various motivations
[2]. Therefore, trusting the CSP blindly for security of the
outsourced data may not be a good idea.
Encryption-before-outsourcing is the fundamental ap-
proach to preserve data privacy and to prevent unautho-
rized access [2], [3]. In this approach, the data are en-
crypted before outsourcing to the cloud storage servers.
However, the data encryption makes searching over the
encrypted data a difficult task [1]. The trivial solution is
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to download the whole database locally, decrypt it using
the corresponding key and then perform search (i.e. keyword
search). Clearly, decryption of the whole database involves
high computation on the local machine and is a cumbersome
task. Downloading the whole database for each and every
keyword search incurs heavy communication overhead on
the system. Thus, this solution is not practical. The other
possible solution is to let CSP decrypt the outsourced data
and perform keyword search over the decrypted data. This
approach violates data privacy [4], as the CSP will get to
know about the plaintext data.
Searchable Encryption (SE) is a preferred approach to ad-
dress these issues, where the users (who use the outsourced
data) delegate keyword search capabilities over encrypted
data to CSP without disclosing any useful information.
Notable works in this area mainly focus on single-owner and
multi-user scenario, where a single owner manages his/her
encrypted data and search capabilities over them [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9]. Some of the single-owner and multi-user based
schemes need to grant search access rights to the users
via a shared secret key [5], [6], [9]; while the others need
to issue search access rights in the form of trapdoors [7],
[8]. The shared secret key based SE schemes [5], [6], [9]
need to perform frequent key re-distribution among the
authorized users to maintain a valid secret key, which is
a costly and cumbersome task [10]. While the trapdoor based
SE schemes [7], [8] need the Owners to be online all the
time for issuing trapdoor to the authorized users. Moreover,
these schemes are not suitable for multi-owner and multi-
user based data outsourcing platforms. The main benefit of
this kind of platforms is that many Owners outsource their
data and many users access those data [11]. For example,
in the platforms like [12], [13], [14], many Owners share
2their data with multiple users while outsourcing. The shared
secret key based SE schemes cannot perform well in these
platforms due to the high complexity of secret key manage-
ment among a large number of users. Further, the trapdoor
based SE schemes require Owners availability for granting
authorizations to users in real time. Thus, it is a challenging
task to design a SE scheme which performs well in a multi-
owner and multi-user based cloud environment along with
fine-grained search authorization1.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) has already emerged
as a popular cryptographic technique for achieving fine-
grained access control over encrypted data in untrusted
cloud environment [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. In ABE,
encrypted data and secret keys are closely linked to some
attributes and any user is able to decrypt an encrypted data
if there is a match between the attributes associated with the
encrypted data and the attributes associated with the secret
keys of the users [21]. ABE has two variants: Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) [22] and Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [23]. In KP-
ABE, data are encrypted using some attributes and the
secret keys are associated with an access policy defined over
the attributes. On the contrary, in CP-ABE, access policy
is associated with the encrypted data and the attributes
are associated with the secret key of the users. Thus, CP-
ABE can be a suitable mechanism to design multi-owner and
multi-user based SE system, as it provides the Owners to
choose access policies of their choice and any user having a
qualified set of attributes can search those encrypted data.
Using the advantages of CP-ABE, Sun et al. [11], [24] and Hu
et al. [25] designmulti-owner and multi-user based SE schemes
for achieving various functionalities. However, Sun et al.’s
schemes [11], [24] do not support expressive access policy2
and practical usability of the schemes are also questionable
due to the use of excessive costly cryptographic operations
[26]. Moreover, the existing schemes [11], [24], [25] require
setting up secure-channels to communicate between the
users and CSP. Otherwise, any outsider can launch a keyword
guessing attack3, which may compromise data secrecy. It is
to be noted that, the construction of a secure-channel is
costly in case high-level security is required, as a cumber-
some public key infrastructure with heavy trust relationship
management is usually needed [27], [28]. There are some
additional challenges such as conjunctive keyword search4,
granting search access right to the newly joined users and
revoking search access right from a user in the keyword
search area that need to be addressed.
In this paper, we further investigate the issues of key-
word search mechanisms and propose a secure and effi-
cient scheme for authorized keyword search over encrypted
data for multi-owner and multi-user cloud environment. The
salient features of this paper are enumerated as follows:
1Fine-grained search authorization means that different users may
possess different search access rights over different encrypted data.
2Expressive access policy consists of both boolean “AND” and “OR”
gates. The access policy in [11], [24] consists of only boolean “AND”
gates.
3In keyword guessing attack, an attacker successfully guesses the
keywords [27].
4In conjunctive keyword search, the user should be able to search
multiple keywords with one search request [24].
1) an expressive fine-grained authorized keyword
search scheme is designed for multi-owner and multi-
user scenarios using the concept of CP-ABE.
2) an interactive protocol is constructed between the user
and CSP to avoid overhead involved in establishing
secure-channel.
3) essential functionalities, like conjunctive keyword
search and user revocation, are added without any
significant overhead.
4) the proposed scheme is proved semantically secure
against chosen keyword attack and outsider’s keyword
guessing attack under the standard assumptions.
5) the implementation of the proposed scheme show
that it takes substantially less computation time to
perform keyword search which makes it suitable
for real life cloud environment compared with the
closely related works [24] and [25].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents a brief overview on some notable works. Problem
Statement of the proposed scheme is presented in Section
3, followed by Preliminaries in Section 4. The proposed
scheme is described in Section 5 followed by its Security
Analysis in Section 6 and Performance Analysis in Section
7. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORKS
After the introduction of the first public key encryption
keyword search (PKEKS) scheme by Boneh et al. [29], sev-
eral mechanism has been proposed for enhancing security,
robustness, and efficiency, e.g. resistance against keyword
guessing attacks [30], [31], [32], multi-key keyword search
[33], [34], [35], conjunctive keyword search [36], [37], [38],
verifiable keyword search [39], [40], [41], keyword search
across multiple independent CSPs [42], keyword search in
multi-authority5 settings [43] and so on. Below, we provide
a brief overview of some existing works related to the
proposed scheme which we divide into two main categories:
Secure-Channel Free Public Key Encryption Keyword Search and
Public Key Encryption Authorized Keyword Search.
2.1 Secure-Channel Free Public Key Encryption Key-
word Search (SCF-PKEKS)
In [28], Baek et al. highlight that Boneh et al.’s scheme needs
secure-channel between a user and the CSP to transmit
trapdoors, which may incur high overhead in terms of com-
munication and processing costs. In addition, if (somehow)
an adversary captures a trapdoor of a user, he/she can use
the captured trapdoor for launching a replay attack. So, Baek
et al. proposed an SCF-PKEKS scheme [28] to address the
issue of Boneh et al.’s scheme [29]. Later, Rhee et al. proposed
[44] to enhance the Baek et al.’s security model [28] for SCF-
PKEKS, where they allow the attacker to obtain the relation
between non-challenge ciphertexts and a trapdoor. Fang et
al. proposed two SCF-PKEKS schemes [30] and [45], where
the former is designed without using random oracle model
and the latter, is designed to prevent outsider keyword
5In multi-authority settings, a user may possess search access rights
from multiple independent authorities.
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Fig. 1: Proposed Cloud Architecture
guessing attack without random oracle. Recently, Jiang et al.
proposed an SCF-PKEKS scheme [27] where the users can
perform keyword search over the authorized encrypted data
only. However, none of the SCF-PKEKS schemes provide
fine-grained search authorization over encrypted data.
2.2 Public Key Encryption Authorized Keyword Search
(PKAKS)
Li et al. proposed an PKAKS scheme [46] using the concept
of Hierarchical Predicate Encryption [47] for multi-owner and
multi-user setting, where only authorized users can perform
keyword search over the encrypted indexes. However, it
incurs high communication overhead, as a user needs to
contact the attribute authority to generate trapdoors for
each search request. Also, the scheme is suitable to perform
keyword search over structured database which contains
limited keywords [24]. Sun et al. addressed the issue of Li
et al.’s scheme [46] and proposed an PKAKS scheme [11]
using the concept of CP-ABE to provide fine-grained search
authorization functionality. A few notable PKAKS schemes
based on ABE techniques have appeared to provide fine-
grained search authorization [24], [25], [26]. However, Sun
et al.’s schemes [11], [24] are not expressive, as the access
policies are constructed using boolean “AND” gates only.
Also, practical usability of the two schemes is questionable,
due to the heavy computational overhead on the system
[26]. In addition, encrypted index size linearly increases
with the total number of attributes in the system. Moreover,
the schemes [11], [24] need secure-channel between a user
and CSP to transmit the trapdoors which is essential to
prevent replay attacks6 and keyword guessing attacks. Cui
et al. proposed a KP-ABE based keyword search scheme
[26], which uses both “AND” and “OR” in the access poli-
cies. However, in [26], a trusted authority is responsible
for choosing access policy related to the keywords to be
searched, i.e., the trusted third-party needs to be contacted
by the users each time a fresh keyword search is requested
for embedding the chosen access policy in the trapdoor.
As the trusted third-party is required to remain online,
this is a major limitation of [26]. Hu et al.’s scheme [25]
is expressive, and also it can update access policies at any
time with the help of the CSP using proxy re-encryption and
secret sharing techniques. However, like [11], [24], Hu et al.’s
scheme [25] needs secure-channels between the users and
6In [11], [24], if an attacker captures a trapdoor, the attacker can
launch replay attacks using the received trapdoor.
CSP to transmit trapdoors. Moreover, the scheme does not
provide conjunctive keyword search and user revocation.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section first presents the System Model of the proposed
scheme followed by its Design Goals, Security Requirements,
Framework, and Adversary and Security Model.
3.1 System Model
The proposed cloud architecture is shown in Figure 1. It con-
sists of five entities, namely, Attribute Authority (AA), Veri-
fication Authority (VA), Owner, Cloud Service Provider (CSP),
and Users. In Figure 1, all the dotted lines represent non
secure-channels, while all the solid lines represent secure-
channels. AA is an independent trusted third-party entity
which maintains public parameter and master secret in the
system. It also issues access rights in the form of secret keys
to the users based on the attributes they possess. VA is also
another third-party entity which keeps secret information
received from the AA. It is to be noted that VA can also be
a set of designated servers under the control of the Cloud
Service Provider. VA mainly verifies search access rights of
the users upon Cloud Service Provider’s request relying on
the shared secret information with AA. Owner outsources
encrypted data to the cloud storage servers. CSP is a third-
party entity which maintains the cloud storage servers and
performs keyword search over the encrypted data based on
a valid search access right of a user and Users are requesting
entities that are authorized to search and access encrypted
data based on their granted privileges.
To enable CSP for performing keyword search, the
Owner generates an encrypted index of some keywords
for a file and stores the encrypted index along with the
encrypted file in remote cloud storage servers. Upon finding
matching encrypted indexes for the search access right, the
CSP returns the corresponding encrypted files to the re-
questing user. It is to be noted that the file can be encrypted
using any secure encryption mechanism, like Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES), which is outside the scope of this
paper.
3.2 Design Goals
The design of the proposed scheme is motivated by provid-
ing security guarantees and efficiency, while ensuring:
4i) Expressive authorized keyword search: the proposed
scheme should first support general access poli-
cies that can be presented in any boolean formula
with “AND” and “OR” gates. Second, it should
allow only the authorized users to perform keyword
search.
ii) Multi-owner and multi-user keyword search: the
scheme should accommodate many Owners and
users. Each user should be able to perform search
over the encrypted data belonging to multiple Own-
ers.
iii) Conjunctive keyword search: the scheme should be
able to search multiple keywords with one search
request.
iv) Efficient revocation: the scheme should be able to
revoke users and their attributes efficiently.
v) Secure-channel free keyword search: users should be
able to send their trapdoors with no use of secure-
channels.
3.3 Security Requirements
The proposed scheme has to ensure the following security
requirements:
a) Keyword secrecy: without qualified trapdoors any out-
sider and the CSP should not be able to learn any useful in-
formation about the plaintext keywords from the encrypted
indexes. Similarly, an outsider should not be able to learn
any useful information about the plaintext keywords from
the trapdoors. These two security notions can be captured
by Keyword Semantic Security, which implies that encrypted
indexes do not reveal any useful information about the
plaintext keywords. This security notion is referred to as
selective indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack under
selective ciphertext policy model (IND-sCP-CKA).
b) Keyword guessing attack: in practical scenarios, the
keyword space is considered to be small (limited) [45].
Therefore, any malicious entity may try to guess a plaintext
keyword from the encrypted index as well as from the
trapdoor by exhaustively guessing the keywords offline,
which is referred to as keyword guessing attack. The keyword
guessing attack can be launched by an insider (i.e. cloud
servers) or by an outsider (neither the cloud servers nor the
receiver). It is desirable that a scheme should prevent these
two attacks. But, according to the earlier works [45], [48], it
is impossible to design a public key keyword search scheme
which can protect insider’s keyword guessing attack. There-
after, in this paper, we only consider the outsider keyword
guessing attack.
3.4 Framework
In a high-level system overview, the proposed scheme is
organized into five phases: Initialization, Owner Registration,
Encryption, Key Generation, and Keyword Search. In Initial-
ization phase, AA generates system parameters by initiat-
ing ASETUP algorithm. Before enciphering search indexes,
Owners need to register himself/herself to the AA. This
registration process is done in the Owner Registration phase,
where AA starts the OREG algorithm to register the Owners.
Before outsourcing data to the remote cloud servers, Owner
encrypts selected keywords of a file and forms an index.
TABLE 1: ACRONYMS
Notation Description
q A large prime number
Fq A field of integer modulo q
G1,G2,GT Multiplicative cyclic subgroups of Fq
Z∗q Multiplicative group of Zq , the integer modulo q
CT Encrypted index
IDi, IDo Unique identity of ith user and an Owner respec-
tively
W A set of keywords
UA Attribute universe
SIDi Attribute set possessed by the i
th user
Γ Access policy
PubIDi Public key of the i
th user
SKIDi Secret key of the i
th user
Dpj, D
′
pj Components of the secret key SKIDi related to the
jth attribute
Priv1IDi , Priv
2
IDi
Private keys of the ith user
AWSIDi
Attribute witness of the ith user
Afterwards, Owner sends the encrypted index and the
corresponding encrypted file to the CSP. Owner encrypts
the keywords by initiating ENCRYPT algorithm. When User
wants to retrieve files from the CSP, he/she initiates Keyword
Search phase. The Keyword Search phase is further divided
into two sub-phases: Trapdoor Generation and Search. In the
Trapdoor Generation phase, the user delegates search capa-
bility to the CSP by sending his/her search access rights
in a trapdoor form. User derives trapdoor by initiating
an interactive protocol with the CSP. When the interactive
protocol is over, the user initiates the TRAPGEN algorithm
to derive trapdoor. Upon receiving the trapdoor from the
user, CSP first checks the validity of the user’s search access
right by taking assistance from the VA which runs the
ATTVERI algorithm. Afterwards, CSP runs the KEYSEARCH
algorithm to perform keyword search over the encrypted
indexes using the received trapdoor. A brief overview of
the different algorithms of these phases is given below. The
acronyms use in this paper are shown in Table 1.
1) ASETUP ((MSK, PP) ← 1λ): this algorithm takes a
security parameter 1λ as input and outputs master
secret key MSK and public parameter PP.
2) OREG (EKeyIDo ← (MSK, IDo)): this algorithm takes
the master secret key MSK and identity IDo as in-
put and outputs an encryption key EKeyIDo for the
Owner IDo.
3) ENCRYPT (CT ← (W,Γ, EKeyIDo , PP)): it takes a key-
word setW, an access policy Γ, Owner’s encryption
key EKeyIDo , and public parameter PP as input and
outputs an encrypted index CT for the keyword set
W.
4) KEYGEN ((SKIDu , PubIDu) ← (MSK, IDu, SIDu)): this
algorithm takes the master secret key MSK, unique
identity IDu of a user, and attribute set SIDu of
the user IDu as input and outputs a secret key
SKIDu =
〈
{Dpi, D
′
pi}i∈SIDu , Priv
1
IDu
, Priv2IDu , AWSIDu
〉
and a public key PubIDu for the user IDu.
5) TRAPGEN (Trap ← (w, SKIDu , PubIDu)): it is ex-
ecuted in the Trapdoor Generation phase by the
user. It takes a plaintext keyword w, secret
key SKIDu and public key PubIDu of a user
IDu as input and outputs a trapdoor Trap =
5〈
{tr1i, tr2i}∀i∈SIDu , tr3, tr4, tr5, tr6
〉
.
6) ATTVERI (({(gd1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu / ⊥) ←
(MK, tr6, g
d
1 , SIDu , IDu)): this algorithm is initiated
by the VA in the Search phase. It takes secret MK,
trapdoor component tr6, g
d
1 , and attribute set SIDu
of the user IDu as input, where g
d
1 is sent by the
user IDu to the CSP during the interactive protocol
which is described in Section 5.2.5 and MK is a secret
tuple sent by AA to the VA which is defined in
Section 5.2.1. It outputs either {(gd1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu or
⊥, where ai represents the secret key associated
with the ith attribute and (ϕ, {ai}∀i∈UA) ∈ MK.
It is to be noted that, ⊥ represents unsuccessful
authentication (i.e., the user IDu does not have
qualified attributes). It is also to be noted that
VA computes {(gd1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu after successful
authentication of the user IDu (i.e., user IDu
possesses qualified attributes).
7) KEYSEARCH (Files ← ({(gd1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu / ⊥
, Trap, SIDu ,CT)): it is run by the CSP in the Search
phase after the ATTVERI algorithm. If the algo-
rithm takes ⊥ as input, then it aborts. If it takes
{(gd1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu , trapdoor Trap, attribute set SIDu
of the user IDu, and encrypted index CT as input,
then it outputs all the (encrypted) Files related with
the encrypted indexes which match with the Trap.
3.5 Adversary and Security Model
This section first presents the adversary model followed by
the security model.
3.5.1 Adversary Model
In the proposed scheme, we consider two kinds of adver-
saries: honest-but-curious entity and malicious entity. The
CSP and the VA are considered to be the honest-but-curious
entities. They honestly perform all the tasks assigned to
them, but they may try to gain extra knowledge based on
the data available to them. Any malicious outsider (neither
the CSP nor the legitimate user) may try to learn about the
plaintext keywords from the trapdoors which are transmit-
ted through public channels. It is assumed that the CSP does
not collude with the malicious users, like in [11], [24].
3.5.2 Security Model
The security model of the proposed scheme is defined by the
following two games, namely Semantic Security against Cho-
sen Keyword Attacks (IND-sCP-CKA) and Indistinguishability
against Outsider’s Keyword Guessing Attacks (IND-O-KGA)
which are presented in Section 3.5.2.1 and Section 3.5.2.2
respectively.
3.5.2.1 Semantic Security against Chosen Key-
word Attacks: The semantic security game IND-sCP-CKA
is played between an adversary A1 and a challenger defin-
ing the following steps:
- INIT The adversary A1 submits a challenge access
policy Γ∗ to the challenger.
- SETUP The challenger runs the ASETUP algorithm to
obtain the public parameters PP and master secret MSK. The
challenger sends the public parameters PP, and extra secret
information ϕ and {ai}UA to the adversary A1. It keeps MSK
secret.
- PHASE 1 Adversary A1 makes the following queries:
• Interactive protocol queries Adversary A1 submits
a challenged identity to the challenger and the chal-
lenger returns interactive protocol parameters to the
adversary.
• Trapdoor queries Adversary A1 requests for trap-
doors by submitting a keyword w ∈ W to the
challenger. It is to be noted that the adversary A1
can query for trapdoors by polynomially many times
to the challenger. The challenger generates the corre-
sponding trapdoor using TRAPGEN algorithm and
sends the trapdoor to the adversary A1.
- CHALLENGE The adversary A1 submits two equal length
keywords w0 and w1 ∈ W, which were not challenged
before, to the challenger. The challenger flips a random coin
b ∈ {0, 1} and generates an encrypted index for the key-
word using ENCRYPT algorithm, where Γ∗ is the challenge
access policy. The challenger returns the encrypted index
CTb to the adversary A1.
- PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1.
- GUESS The adversary A1 submits a guess b
′ ∈ {0, 1}
and wins the game if b = b′.
It is to be noted that in the Phase 1 the challenger sends ϕ
and {ai}UA to the adversary A1. This enables the adversary
A1 to answer all the queries of the attribute verification
oracle. Therefore, we are not considering attribute verifica-
tion oracle in our security model. Also, the trapdoor query
oracle in PHASE 1 implicitly includes the key generation
query oracle, which may send the secret keys (please refer
to Section 5.2.4) back to the adversary A1. Moreover, in our
selective model, the game allows the adversary A1 to query
any keywords of its choice at PHASE 1 and PHASE 2 as long
as the attribute sets related with the queried trapdoors do
not satisfy the challenge access policy Γ∗.
Definition 3.1. The proposed scheme is IND-sCP-CKA se-
cure if the advantage AdvIND-sCP-CKAA1 in winning the security
game is negligible for any polynomial time adversary A1.
AdvIND-sCP-CKAA1 (1
λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
3.5.2.2 Indistinguishability against Outsider’s
Keyword Guessing Attacks: The IND-O-KGA ensures that
outsiders cannot guess the keyword from a given trapdoor
using keyword guessing attacks. The IND-O-KGA game
[45] is played between a challenger and an adversary as
follows:
- SETUP The challenger runs the ASETUP algorithm to
obtain the public parameters PP and master secret MSK. The
challenger sends the public parameters PP, ϕ, and {ai}UA to
the adversary A2. It keeps MSK secret.
- PHASE 1 Adversary A1 makes the following queries:
• Interactive protocol queries Adversary A1 submits
a challenged identity to the challenger and the chal-
lenger returns interactive protocol parameters.
• Trapdoor queries Adversary A2 requests for trap-
doors by submitting a keyword w ∈ W and attribute
set of his/her choice to the challenger. It is to be
6noted that the adversary A2 can query for trapdoors
by polynomially many times to the challenger. The
challenger generates the corresponding trapdoor us-
ing TRAPGEN algorithm and sends the trapdoor to
the adversary A2.
- CHALLENGE The adversary A2 submits two equal
length keywords w0 and w1 ∈ W, which were not chal-
lenged before, to the challenger. The challenger flips a
random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and generates a trapdoor Trapb
for the keyword using TRAPGEN algorithm. The challenger
returns the generated trapdoor Trapb to the adversary A2.
- PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1.
- GUESS The adversary A2 submits a guess b
′ ∈ {0, 1}
and wins the game if b = b′.
Similar with the semantic security game IND-sCP-CKA,
the adversary A2 is able to answer all attribute verification
queries by itself. So, we are not considering attribute verifi-
cation oracle in the security model.
Definition 3.2. The proposed scheme is IND-O-KGA secure
if the advantage AdvIND-O-KGAA2 in winning the security game
is negligible for any polynomial time adversary A2.
AdvIND-O-KGAA2 (1
λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
4 PRELIMINARIES
This section presents a brief description on some basic
concepts, e.g. Sibling Intractable Function Family, Bilinear Map,
Bilinear-map Accumulator, and some mathematical assump-
tions, which shall be used in the following sections of this
paper.
4.1 The Sibling Intractable Function Family (SIFF)
SIFF is a generalization of the concept of the universal one-
way hash function family [49]. Zheng et al. presented the
concept of SIFF in [49]. In SIFF, given a set of initial strings
colliding with one another, it is hard to compute another
string that would collide with the initial strings.
SIFF can be applied to solve many existing problems
[49]. One of the applications of SIFF is the shared mailbox
problem, i.e., how to manage 1 million passwords for shared
devices? Let us assume that a system has n users, and
it wants to share a message m among the n users after
encrypting using a secret key, say sk. Typically, each n users
will have a different key, say ith user possesses the key ki
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The system will choose a polynomial
P (x), where
P (x) = xn + a1x
n−1 + ...+ ajx
n−j + ...+ an
Now, the system computes an equation P (x) = sk, where
each key of the n users will be a root of the equation.
Afterward, the system can compute the coefficients of the
equation and publishes them. As a result, a user among the
n users who holds a key, say ki, can get the secret key sk by
computing P (ki). As such, the user can access the message
m by decrypting the encrypted message.
4.2 Bilinear Map
This section introduces the concept of asymmetric bilinear
pairings, used in this paper, which is modified Weil/Tate
pairing defined on Elliptic Curve [50].
a) Bilinear pairing: Let g1 and g2 be two random
generators of G1 and G2 respectively. The Bilinear map
eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT has the following properties:
• Bilinear: eˆ(ga1 , g
b
2) = eˆ(g1, g2)
ab, ∀g1, g2 and ∀(a, b) ∈
Z
∗2
q ; where Z
∗
q denotes the multiplicative group of
Zq , the integer modulo q.
• Non-degenerate: if g1 generates G1 and g2 generates
G2, then eˆ(g1, g2) generates GT .
• Computable: there exists an efficient algorithm to com-
pute eˆ(g1, g2), for all g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2.
Note that, if G1 = G2 then the bilinear pairing is called as
symmetric pairing.
4.3 Bilinear-map Accumulator
Bilinear-map accumulator [51], [52] is an efficient mecha-
nism which provides a constant-size value, called an Ac-
cumulator, of a large set of inputs. It also provides another
constant-size value, called as Witness, to facilitate authenti-
cation and revocation of the inputs. For authentication and
revocation, the witness for any element in the set is used to
verify the (non-)membership of the element in this set.
Let G1,G2 and GT be multiplicative groups of a large
prime number q. Let eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT be a bilinear
map having all the properties as described in Section 4.2.
Let g1 and g2 be two generators of G1 and G2 respec-
tively. An accumulator AccL can be constructed as follows:
AccL = g
∏
ai∈L
(ai+s)
1 , where L = {a1, a2, ..., an} in Z
∗n
q for
some positive integer n and s ∈ Z∗q . The
∏
ai∈Z∗q
(ai + s)
is called characteristic polynomial for the set L. A witness
Wit(L\L′) for a set L
′ ⊆ L can be constructed as follows:
Wit(L\L′) = g
∏
ai∈(L\L
′)
(ai+s)
1 . The set L
′ verification can be
carried as follows:
eˆ(Wit(L\L′), g
∏
ai∈L
′
(ai+s)
2 )
?
= eˆ(AccL, g2)
The security of bilinear-map accumulator is based on the
q-strong bilinear Diffie-Hellman (q-SBDH) assumption [53].
4.4 Mathematical Assumptions
Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative groups of a large
prime order q and let g1 and g2 be generators of G1 and
G2 respectively. Let eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT be a non-degenerate
bilinear map.
i) External Diffie-Hellman (XDH) Assumption 7 [55]: No
probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm is able to distinguish
whether Z = gab1 or Z = g
r
1 from the tuple
< g1, g
a
1 , g
b
1, Z > with non-negligible advantage,
where (a, b, r) ∈ Z∗3q (i.e., the DDH assumption
holds within G1).
7It is believed that the XDH assumption may hold in certain
subgroups of MNT elliptic curves [54].
7ii) Mixed External Diffie-Hellman (MXDH) Assumption8
[56]: Given < g1, g
a
1 , g
b
1, Z, g
a
2 , g
b
2 >, no probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm is able to distinguish
whether Z = gab1 or Z = g
r
1 from the tuple
< g1, g
a
1 , g
b
1, Z > with non-negligible advantage,
where (a, b, r) ∈ Z∗3q (i.e., the DDH assumption
holds within G1).
5 THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents proposed scheme. First, a brief
overview of the proposed scheme is presented followed by
its construction.
5.1 Overview
The main goal of the proposed scheme is to enable the
Owners to enforce search access policies within the data
encrypted index itself to achieve fine-grained search autho-
rization. By leveraging andmodifying the concept of Zhao et
al.’s work [57], the Owners embed expressive access policies
in the form of propositional formula, which contains “AND”
and “OR” gates, into the encrypted indexes. Any user, who
holds a qualified set of attributes that satisfy the access
policies of the encrypted indexes, can delegate keyword
search capabilities to the CSP without disclosing any useful
information about the actual contents of the ciphertexts (i.e.,
encrypted indexes and encrypted data).
Moreover, for the VA to verify attributes of a user and
also to revoke the attributes without performing costly
ciphertext re-encryption operations, the proposed scheme
uses the concept of bilinear-map accumulators. This search
access right verification relying on ID-based techniques effi-
ciently improves the authorization phase, as the expensive
Search phase is launched only if the requesting user has
correct search access rights.
5.2 Construction
Let UA = {Att1, Att2, ..., Att|UA|} be the attribute universe
in the system for a certain positive number |UA|. The pro-
posed scheme consists of five phases and these phases are
described below in details.
5.2.1 Initialization
In this phase, AA initializes the system and generates sys-
tem parameters like master secret and public parameters. It
consists of ASETUP algorithm, which is described below.
– ASETUP ((MSK, PP) ← 1λ): AA chooses bilinear
groups G1,G2 and GT of a large prime order q and bi-
linear map eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT . AA also selects two
generators g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2, hash functions H :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q and H1 : {0, 1}
l → Z∗q , and random num-
bers (µ, ρ, ϕ, ̺, θ, υ, {ti}∀i∈UA , {ai}∀i∈UA) ∈ Z
∗(6+|UA|)
q . AA
publishes the public parameters PP, where
PP =
〈
q,G1,G2,GT , g1, eˆ, H,H1, g
ρ
1 , g
µ
1 , g
µ
2 , g
̺
1 ,
{Ti = g
ti
1 , T
′
i = g
ti
2 }(∀Atti∈UA)
〉
8MXDH is a slightly stronger variant of the XDH assumption [56].
It keeps the master secret MSK in a secure place, where
MSK =
〈
g2, µ, ρ, ϕ, ̺, θ, υ, {ti, ai}∀i∈UA
〉
Also, the AA sends the tuple MK, where MK =〈
ϕ, θ, {ai}∀i∈UA
〉
and ̺ to the VA and the CSP respectively
using secure-channel9. It is to be noted that VA is going to
use MK for verification of users’ attributes in the Keyword
Search phase as detailed in Section 5.2.5 and ̺ is going to be
used by the CSP to randomize the trapdoors in the Trapdoor
Generation phase as described in Section 5.2.5.
5.2.2 Owner Registration
In this phase, AA initiates registrations of the Owners and
issues a secret key for the registered Owner. Any newly
joined Owner needs to register himself/herself with the AA.
This phase relies on the OREG algorithm defined as follows.
– OREG
(
EKeyIDo ← (MSK, IDo)
)
: let IDo be the
unique identity of the newly registered Owner. AA chooses
a random number ro ∈ Z
∗
q and computes secret key EKeyIDo
for the Owner as follows:
EKeyIDo = 〈g
υ·ro
1 , g
ro
2 〉
Afterwards, AA sends EKeyIDo to the newly registered
Owner IDo using a secure-channel.
5.2.3 Encryption
In this phase, Owner encrypts a set of keywords of a file.
This phase consists of an ENCRYPT algorithm.
– ENCRYPT (CT ← (W,Γ, EKeyIDo , PP)): it takes a
keyword setW, an access policy Γ, the secret encryption key
of the Owner EKeyIDo and the public parameters PP as input.
It outputs an encrypted index of the keyword set W. The
Owner chooses an access policy in propositional formula.
Let Γ be the access policy defined as:
Γ = {ap′1 OR ap
′
2 AND ap
′
3 AND ... OR ap
′
m′}
where ap′1, ap
′
2, ..., ap
′
m are sub-propositional formula of Γ.
Owner can easily transform the access policy Γ into Sum of
Product (SOP) form. In the sequel, the new access policy is
defined as:
Γ = {ap1 OR ap2 OR ... OR apn}
where api∀i ∈ [1, n] are sub-propositional formula of Γ and
each api contains only boolean AND of the attributes in UA.
That is,
appi = {Attp1 AND Attp2 AND ... AND Attpi′}
where Attpj ∈ UA and 1 ≤ j ≤ i
′.
Then, the Owner computesQ′i, Qi and ωi for all i ∈ [1, n]
as:
Qi = g
i′·µ
1 ·
i′∏
j=1
Tij = g
(i′·µ+
∑i′
j=1 tij)
1
Q′i =
i′∏
j=1
T ′ij = g
∑i′
j=1 tij
2
ω′i = eˆ(Qi, Q
′
i) = eˆ(g1, g2)
(
i′µ+
∑i′
j=1 tij
)
·
(∑i′
j=1 tij
)
ωi = H(ω
′
i)
9The secure-channel can be established using Secure Socket Layer
(SSL).
8The Owner then chooses a random number y ∈ Z∗q and com-
putes a polynomial P (x) using SIFF, described in Section 4.
P (x) = xn + a1x
(n−1) + ...+ aix
(n−i) + ...+ an
where ωi for all i ∈ [1, n] are the n solutions of the equation
P (x) − y = 0. Finally, the Owner chooses a keyword set W
of a file and encrypts each keyword wk ∈ W as follows:
i) chooses a random number r ∈ Z∗q and computes
Ck, C1, and C2 as follows:
Ck =
(
(gρ1)
H1(wk) · gυ·ro1
)r·y
= g
ρ·H1(wk)·r·y
1 · g
υ·ro·r·y
1
C1 =(g
µ
2 )
r = gµ·r2
C2 =(g
ro
2 )
r = gro·r2
ii) computes all the coefficients of P (x), {Co[j] =
aj}(∀j∈[1,n]).
The final encrypted index is CT =〈
{Ck}{∀wk∈W}, C1, C2, {Co[j]}(∀j∈[1,n]),Γ
〉
. Finally, the
Owner sends the encrypted index CT along with the
encrypted file to the CSP.
5.2.4 Key Generation
This phase is run by the AA to generate secret keys and
public keys for the users. It consists of KEYGEN algorithm.
– KEYGEN ((SKIDu , PubIDu) ← (MSK, IDu, SIDu)): in
this algorithm, the master secret MSK, user’s unique identity
IDu and the attribute set SIDu of the user are taken as input.
It outputs a secret key SKIDu and a public key PubIDu for the
user IDu.
Let, SIDu = {Attp1, Attp2, ..., Attps′} be the set at-
tributes possess by the user IDu. AA computes the se-
cret key SKIDu =
〈
{Dpi, D
′
pi}∀i∈[1,s′], Priv
1
IDu
, Priv2IDu , AWSIDu
〉
and public key PubIDu for the user IDu as follows: let
(b, u) ∈ Z∗2q be two random numbers and suppose QIDu =
[H1(IDu) + u]
i) Dpi = g
(µ+tpi)µ·b
1 · g
ϕ·ai
1
ii) D′pi = g
tpi
µ·b
2
iii) Priv1IDu = g
ρ·QIDu
µ
1
iii) Priv2IDu = g
υ·QIDu
1
v) PubIDu = g
QIDu
2
vi) AWSIDu = g
∏
i∈(UA\SIDu
)
[ai+θ·H1(IDu)]
2
Afterwards, AA sends the secret keys SKIDu to the user IDu
using a secure-channel and publishes the public key PubIDu
in its public bulletin board.
5.2.5 Keyword Search
This phase begins when a user wants to retrieve relevant
encrypted files of a keyword from the CSP. It includes two
sub-phases, namely, Trapdoor Generation and Search, detailed
below.
5.2.5.1 Trapdoor Generation: in this phase, a user
generates trapdoors for the keywords of his/her choice to
delegate search capabilities to the CSP. This phase consists
of a TRAPGEN algorithm.
– TRAPGEN ( Trap ← (wk, SKIDu , PubIDu) ):
this algorithm takes the public key PubIDu , secret key
SKIDu =
〈
{Dpi, D
′
pi}(∀i∈[1,s′]), Priv
1
IDu
, Priv2IDu , AWSIDu
〉
of the
user IDu and a keyword wk as input, and outputs a trap-
door Trap to perform keyword search. Before generating
the trapdoor Trap, the user and the CSP participate in an
interactive protocol. In this protocol, the user needs to interact
with the CSP for sending the trapdoor to the CSP with no
use of secure-channels. The procedure for the interactive
protocol is given below.
i) the user IDu chooses a random number d ∈ Z
∗
q for
the current session. The user IDu computes g
d
1 and
sends gd1 and identity IDu to the CSP. The user IDu
temporarily keeps d in his/her database.
ii) after receiving the request from the user IDu, CSP
chooses a random number nc for current session. It
computes (PubIDu)
1
nc and g̺·nc1 , where PubIDu is the
public key of the user IDu which is available from
the AA’s public bulletin board and ̺ is the secret
key of the CSP. The CSP temporarily keeps gd1 and
nc in its database, and sends (PubIDu)
1
nc and g̺·nc1
to the user IDu.
Upon receiving the tuple
〈
(PubIDu)
1
nc , g̺·nc1
〉
from the CSP,
the user IDu checks validity of the tuple by comparing
eˆ(g̺1 , PubIDu)
?
= eˆ(g̺·nc1 , (PubIDu)
1
nc ), where g̺1 is a pub-
lic parameter. If the tuple is valid, the user chooses a
random number d′ ∈ Z∗q and then generates trapdoor
Trap =
〈
{tr1i, tr2i}∀i∈[1,s′], tr3, tr4, tr5, tr6
〉
as follows:
i) tr1i = (Dpi · g
̺·nc
1 )
d = g
(µ+tpi)µ·b·d
1 · g
ϕ·d·ai
1 · g
̺·nc·d
1
ii) tr2i = D
′
pi
1/d
= g
tsi
µ·b·d
2
iii) tr3 = (Priv
1
IDu
)H1(wk)·d·d
′
= g
ρ·QIDu ·H1(wk)·d·d
′
µ
1
iv) tr4 =
(
Priv2IDu
)d·d′
= g
υ·QIDu ·d·d
′
1
v) tr5 =
(
(PubIDu)
1
nc
)d·d′
= g
QIDu
·d·d′
nc
2
vi) tr6 = (AWSIDu )
1/d = g
∏
i∈(UA\SIDu
)
(ai + θ ·H1(IDu))/d
2
The user IDu sends the trapdoor Trap =〈
{tr1i, tr2i}∀i∈[1,s′], tr3, tr4, tr5, tr6
〉
, SIDu , and IDu
to the CSP.
5.2.5.2 Search: in this phase, CSP performs key-
word search over the encrypted indexes using the trapdoor
Trap received from the user and finally returns the (en-
crypted) files associated with the keywords that has match
with the trapdoor Trap. This phase is composed of ATTVERI
and KEYSEARCH algorithms. The ATTVERI algorithm is run
by the VA to check validity the users’ attributes which they
possess; while the KEYSEARCH algorithm is run by the CSP
to perform keyword search if and only if the VA successfully
validates the requesting user’s attributes in the ATTVERI
algorithm. It implies that the CSP needs to contact the VA
for validity checking of user’s attributes. Details of the two
algorithms are presented below.
– ATTVERI(({(gd1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu / ⊥) ←
(MK, tr6, g
d
1 , SIDu , IDu)): in this algorithm, VA takes
tr6, g
d
1 , SIDu , and IDu as inputs, where tr6, g
d
1 , SIDu , and
IDu are sent by the CSP and MK is sent by the AA. It outputs
9{(gd1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu or ⊥ based on the following comparison:
the VA compares
eˆ
((
gd1
) ∏
i∈SIDu
(ai+θ·H1(IDu))
, tr6
)
?
= AccUA ,
where AccIDu = eˆ
(
g
∏
i∈UA
(ai+θ·H1(IDu))
1 , g2
)
If both are equal then the VA returns {(gd1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu
to the CSP which implies that the attribute set SIDu is valid.
Note that AccIDu can be precomputed by the VA.
Proof of consistency:
eˆ
((
gd1
) ∏
i∈SIDu
(ai+θ·H1(IDu))
, tr6
)
= eˆ

gd[
∏
i∈SIDu
(ai+θ·H1(IDu))]
1 , g
∏
i∈(UA\SIDu
)
(ai + θ ·H1(IDu))/d
2


= eˆ (g1, g2)
∏
i∈UA
(ai+θ·H1(IDu))
= eˆ(g
∏
i∈UA
(ai+θ·H1(IDu))
1 , g2)
= AccIDu
Otherwise VA returns ⊥ to the CSP which implies that the
attribute set SIDu is not valid (i.e. the attribute set SIDu
contains one or more revoked or invalid attributes).
– KEYSEARCH (Files ← ({(gd1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu / ⊥
, Trap, SIDu ,CT)): in this algorithm, if the CSP receives
⊥ from the VA, the CSP aborts the connection for the
user IDu. Otherwise, if the CSP receives {(g
d
1)
ϕ·ai}∀i∈SIDu
from the VA for the user IDu, it performs the key-
word search over the encrypted index CT which access
policy is satisfied by the user’s attribute set SIDu . For
the keyword search, the CSP uses the trapdoor Trap =〈
{tr1i, tr2i}∀i∈[1,s′], tr3, tr4, tr5, tr6
〉
and if the trapdoor
matches with some keywords then it returns the files
associated with the keywords to the user. Let CT =〈
{Ck}{∀wk∈W}, C1, C2, {Co[j]}(∀j∈[1,n]),Γ
〉
be the index of
the keyword set W. CSP performs the keyword search as
follows.
Let apps′ = {Attp1 AND Attp2 AND ... AND Attps′} be
the sub-access policy, where apps′ ⊆ Γ, which is satisfied by
the user’s attribute set SIDu . The CSP computes (g
d
1)
̺·nc =
g̺·nc·d1 and then computes X,Y,w
′
s, value, y, V1, V2 and V3
as follows:
i) X = g
(s′µ+
s′∑
i=1
tpi)µ·b·d
1 , where
X =
∏
i∈app
s′
tr1i
∏
i∈app
s′
(
gd1
)ϕ·ai · g̺·nc·d1
=
g
(s′µ+
s′∑
i=1
tpi)µ·b·d
1 · g
ϕ·d
s′∑
i=1
ai
1 · g
̺·nc·d
1
g
ϕ·d
s′∑
i=1
ai
1 · g
̺·nc·d
1
=g
(s′µ+
s′∑
i=1
tpi)µ·b·d
1
ii) Y =
∏
i∈app
s′
tr2i = g
s′∑
i=1
tpi
µ·b·d
2
iii) ω′s = eˆ(X,Y ) = eˆ (g1, g2)
(s′µ+
s′∑
j=1
tpj)(
s′∑
j=1
tpj)
iv) value = H(ω′s)
v) y = P (value). It is to be noted that, if ∃apj ∈ AP
such that apj = {Attp1 AND Attp2 AND ... AND Attps′}
then value is one of the solutions of P (x) − y = 0. Hence,
y = P (value).
vi) computes z = ync . Note that nc is known to the CSP.
vii) computes V1, where
V1 = eˆ ((tr3)
z
, C1) = eˆ

(g ρ·QIDu ·H1(wk)·d·d′µ1
) y
nc
, gµ·r2


= eˆ(g1, g2)
ρ·QIDu ·H1(wk)·d·d
′·y·r
nc
viii) computes V2, where
V2 = eˆ((tr4)
z, C2) = eˆ
((
g
υ·QIDu ·d·d
′
1
) y
nc
, gro·r2
)
= eˆ (g1, g2)
υ·QIDu ·d·d
′·ro·r·y
nc
ix) computes V3, where
V3 = eˆ(Ck, tr5)
= eˆ
(
g
ρ·H1(wk)·r·y
1 · g
υ·ro·r·y
1 , g
QIDu
·d·d′
nc
2
)
= eˆ (g1, g2)
[ρ·H1(wk)·r·y+υ·ro·r·y]·
QIDu
·d·d′
nc
= eˆ (g1, g2)
ρ·H1(wk)·r·y·QIDu ·d·d
′
nc
+
υ·ro·r·y·QIDu ·d·d
′
nc
= eˆ (g1, g2)
ρ·QIDu ·H1(wk)·d·d
′·y·r
nc · eˆ(g1, g2)
υ·QIDu ·d·d
′·ro·r·y
nc
Now, the CSP checks V3
?
= V1 · V2, if equals then CSP
returns the file associated with the keyword wk.
Proof of consistency:
V1 · V2 =eˆ (g1, g2)
ρ·QIDu ·H1(wk)·d·d
′·y·r
nc · eˆ(g1, g2)
υ·QIDu ·d·d
′·ro·r·y
nc
=V3
5.3 Conjunctive Keyword Search
In practical use cases, a user may want to access files
which contain several intended keywords using one search
request, which is known as Conjunctive Keyword Search.
The proposed scheme can easily perform conjunctive key-
word search. For this purpose, the user needs to con-
struct tr3 component of the trapdoor trap as follows:
tr3 =
(
Priv1IDu
)∑H1(wk)·d·d′ in TRAPGEN algorithm. Ac-
cordingly, the CSP needs to compute V3 = eˆ (
∏
Ck, tr5)
and V2 = eˆ
(
tr
(z·|
∑
H1(wk)|)
4 , C2
)
in the KEYSEARCH al-
gorithm, where |
∑
H1(wk)| is the number of keywords in
the conjunctive keyword search. Thus, the proposed scheme
achieves conjunctive keyword search without incurring ad-
ditional overhead on the system, which is of high interest.
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5.4 Revocation
Sometimes, it is essential to revoke a user (or attributes
of a user) from the system so that he/she can no longer
perform keyword search (using his/her revoked attributes).
The proposed scheme can revoke a user in two ways: first,
AA can revoke a user by removing the revoked user’s
(say the revoked user be ID′u) public key PubID′u from its
public bulletin board and second, updating the attribute
witness of the non-revoked users as well as the revoked user
by the AA. It can be observed that the former revocation
mechanism can be easily done by the AA. The latter revo-
cation mechanism, where attributes of a user are revoked, is
explained below:
Let the revoked attribute be Atti. AA chooses a fresh
random number a′i ∈ Z
∗
q for the revoked attribute Atti
and computes a fresh attribute witness AW′
SIDu
for each non-
revoked user IDu who holds the revoked attribute Atti,
where AW′
SIDu
=

g
∏
j∈(UA\SIDu
)
(aj+θ·H1(IDu))
2


(
a′i+θ·H1(IDu)
ai+θ·H1(IDu)
)
.
It is to be noted that ai is the old random number associated
with the attribute Atti. Also, AA shares the fresh a
′
i with
VA and VA replaces the old ai related with the attribute
Atti with the fresh a
′
i. It is worth to mention that our revo-
cation mechanism avoids re-encryption of all the encrypted
indexes related with the revoked attributes. Moreover, the
revoked user ID′u needs to update attribute witness from
the AA to perform further keyword search using his/her
non-revoked attributes. The updated attribute witness of the
revoked user ID′u is AW
′
SID′u
, where
AW′
SID′u
=

g
∏
j∈(UA\SID′u
)
(aj+θ·H1(ID
′
u))
2


(
1
ai+θ·H1(ID
′
u)
)
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents the security analysis of the proposed
scheme, with respect to security requirements detailed in
Section 3.3.
It has been observed that the users are authorized based
on the attribute witness they possess. The attribute witness
is based on the concept of bilinear-map accumulator. The
VA uses the trapdoor component tr6, associated to the
attribute witness, to perform user authorization. As explained
in Section 4.3, the security of the accumulator is based on the
q-SBDH assumption. The security proof of accumulators can
be found in [51], [52].
6.1 Keyword Semantic Security
Theorem 1 and its proof demonstrate that the proposed
scheme is IND-sCP-CKA secure under the standard model.
Theorem 1. If a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A1 can
win the IND-sCP-CKA game with non-negligible advantage ǫ,
then a PPT simulator B can be constructed to break the MXDH
assumption with non-negligible advantage ǫ2 .
Proof. In this proof, we show that a simulator B can be
constructed which uses an adversary A1 to gain advantage
ǫ
2 against the proposed scheme.
The MXDH challenger C chooses random numbers
(x,y, r) ∈ Z∗3q and flips a random coin l ∈ {0, 1}. It sets
Z = gx·y1 if l = 0 and Z = g
r
1 otherwise. Afterwards the
challenger C sends the tuple {g1, A = g
x
1 , B = g
y
1 , C =
gx2 , D = g
y
2 , Z} to the simulator B and asks the simulator B
to output l.
In the IND-sCP-CKA game, the simulator B interacts
with the adversary A1 which is defined as follows (simu-
lator B acts as a challenger in the rest of the security game).
- INIT The adversary A1 sends an access policy Γ
∗ in
a form of propositional formula to the simulator B. The
simulator B easily converts the propositional formula Γ∗
into the SOP form, where each sub-formula (or sub-access
policy) is represented as ∂.
– SETUP The simulator B chooses random numbers
(ψ, σ, ξ, ζ, κ, {φi, ηi}∀i∈UA) ∈ Z
∗(5+2|UA|)
q . It also chooses two
collision-resistant hash functions H and H1. Simulator B
computes Aσ = gσ
′
1 and C
σ = gσ
′
2 , where σ
′ = x · σ. It
also computes {Bφi = g
φ′i
1 , D
φi = g
φ′i
2 }∀i∈UA , where {φ
′
i =
y · φi}∀i∈UA . The simulator B outputs the public parameters
PP =
〈
q,G1,G2,GT ,Z
∗
q , H,H1, eˆ, g1, A, g
σ′
1 , g
σ′
2 , g
ζ
1 , {g
φ′i
1 ,
g
φ′i
2 }∀i∈UA
〉
. It sends PP along with ξ, ζ and {ηi}UA
to the adversary A1 and keeps master secret MSK =〈
ψ, σ, κ, {φi}∀i∈UA
〉
in a secure place.
– PHASE 1 Adversary A1 sends the following queries to
the simulator B:
Interactive protocol queries: Adversary A1 sends a
request along with the challenged identity IDj for the in-
teractive protocol parameters to the simulator B. Simulator
B chooses random numbers (u, rj , r
′′
j ) ∈ Z
∗3
q and then sets
hidj = H1(IDj). Afterwards, the simulator B computes the
interactive protocol parameters C
hidj
+ u/rj = g
x(hidj
+ u)/rj
2
and g
ζ·rj ·r
′′
j
1 . It then sends the interactive protocol parame-
ters g
x(hidj
+ u)/rj
2 , g
ζ·rj ·r
′′
j
1 and rj to the adversary A1.
Trapdoor queries: Without loss of generality, adver-
sary A1 submits a keyword wj ∈ W and an attribute set
Sj .
Simulator B computes hwj = H1(wj). It chooses ran-
dom numbers (r′j , r
′′′
j ) ∈ Z
∗2
q . The simulator B computes
trapdoor Trapj =
〈
{tr1ij , tr2ij}∀i∈Sj , tr3j , tr4j , tr5j , tr6j
〉
as follows:
tr1ij =
(
(Aσ ·Bφi)σ·r
′
j · (gηi1 )
ξ
)r′′j · gζ·rj ·r′′j1
= g
(σ′+φ′i)
σ′
x
·r′j ·r
′′
j +ξ·ηi·r
′′
j +ζ·rj ·r
′′
j
1
tr2ij =
(
(Dφi)
1
σ·r′
j
) 1
r′′
j = g
φ′i·x
σ′·r′
j
·r′′
j
2
tr3j = A
(hidj
+u)hwj
·r′′j ·r
′′′
j
σ = g
x·x(hidj
+u)hwj
·r′′j ·r
′′′
j
σ′
1
tr4j = A
(hidj+u)ψ·r
′′
j ·r
′′′
j = g
ψ·x(hidj+u)r
′′
j ·r
′′′
j
1
tr5j =
(
C
(hidj
+ u)/rj
)r′′j ·r′′′j
= g
x(hidj
+ u)r′′j · r
′′′
j /rj
2
tr6j = C
∏
i∈(UA\Sj)
(ηi + κ · hidj
)/r′′j = g
x
∏
i∈(UA\Sj)
(ηi + κ · hidj
)/r′′j
2
Finally, simulator B sends the trapj to the adversary A1.
- CHALLENGE Upon receiving the challenged keywords
w0 and w1 from the adversary A1, the simulator B flips a
random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts wb with the challenged
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access policy Γ∗. The simulator B computes hwb = H1(wb)
and chooses a random number rk ∈ Z
∗
q .
For each sub-access policy (or sub-access formula) ∂ ∈
Γ∗, the simulator B does the following computations: let |∂|
be the number of attributes associated with the sub-access
policy ∂.
Φ1 =(A
σ)|∂|
|∂|∏
i=1
Bφi = g
σ′·|∂|+
|∂|∑
i=1
φ′i
1 ; Φ2 =
|∂|∏
i=1
Dφi = g
|∂|∑
i=1
φ′i
2
ϑ∂ =H(eˆ(Φ1,Φ2))
The simulator B chooses random numbers
(ν, a1, a2, ..., an) ∈ Z
∗(n+1)
q , where n is the number of
sub-access policies ∂ in the access policy Γ∗. The simulator
B computes a polynomial δk(x) using all the values of ϑ∂
for each sub-access policy such that δk(x)− ν = 0.
Finally, the simulator B chooses a random number
rc ∈ Z
∗
q and sends the encrypted index CTwb =〈
Cwb , C1, C2, Cowb [k]∀k∈{1,n}
〉
of the keyword wb to the
adversary A1, where Cwb = Z
hwb ·ν · Bψ··rc·ν , C1 = D
σ =
D
σ′
x , C2 = D
rc and Cowb [k]∀k∈[1,n] are the coefficients of
the equation δk(x)− ν = 0.
- PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1.
- GUESS The adversary A1 guesses a bit b
′ and sends to
the simulator B. If b′ = b then the adversary A1 wins IND-
sCP-CKA game; otherwise it fails. If b′ = b, simulator B
answers “MXDH” in the game (i.e. outputs l = 0); otherwise
B answers “random” (i.e. outputs l = 1).
If Z = gr1 ; then Cwb is completely random from the view
of the adversary A1. So, the received encrypted index CTwb
is not compliant to the game (i.e. invalid encrypted index).
Therefore, the adversary A1 chooses b
′ randomly. Hence,
probability of the adversary A1 for outputting b
′ = b is 12 .
If Z = gx·y1 , then adversary A1 receives a valid en-
crypted index. The adversary A1 knowing more than ex-
pected in the IND-sCP-CKA game (random parameters
being set by the challenger to some predefined values),
wins the IND-sCP-CKA game with non-negligible advan-
tage ǫ (according to the Theorem 1). So, the probability of
outputting b′ = b for the adversary A1 is
1
2 + ǫ, where
probability ǫ is for guessing that the received encrypted
index is valid and probability 12 is for guessing whether the
valid encrypted index CTwb is related to w0 or w1.
Therefore, overall advantage AdvIND-sCP-CKAA1 of the sim-
ulator B is 12 (
1
2 + ǫ+
1
2 )−
1
2 =
ǫ
2 .
6.2 Keyword Guessing Attack
In this section, we prove Theorem 2, thus proving resistance
of our scheme to the keyword guessing attack.
Theorem 2. If a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A2 (in
our case any outsider adversary) can win the IND-O-KGA game
with non-negligible advantage ǫ, then a PPT simulator B can be
constructed to break the MXDH assumption with non-negligible
advantage ǫ2 .
Proof. Assume that an adversary A2 with an advantage ǫ
breaks the proposed scheme. Then a simulator B can be
constructed to solve the MXDH problem with an advantage
ǫ
2 .
The MXDH challenger C chooses random numbers
(a,b, r) ∈ Z∗3q and flips a random coin l ∈ {0, 1}. It sets
Z = gab1 if l = 0 and Z = g
r
1 otherwise. Afterwards, the
challenger C sends the tuple {g1, A = g
a
1 , B = g
b
1 , C =
ga2 , D = g
b
2 , Z} to the simulator B and asks to output l.
Now the simulator B acts as a challenger in the rest of the
security game and interacts with the adversary A2.
– SETUP The simulator B chooses random numbers
(ψ, σ, ξ, ζ, κ, {φi, ηi}∀i∈UA) ∈ Z
∗(5+2|UA|)
q . It also chooses two
collision-resistant hash functions H and H1. Simulator B
computes Aσ = gσ
′
1 and C
σ = gσ
′
2 , where σ
′ = a · σ. It
also computes {Bφi = g
φ′i
1 , D
φi = g
φ′i
2 }∀i∈UA , where {φ
′
i =
b · φi}∀i∈UA . The simulator B outputs the public parameters
PP =
〈
q,G1,G2,GT ,Z
∗
q , H,H1, eˆ, g1, A, g
σ′
1 , g
σ′
2 , g
ζ
1 , {g
φ′i
1 ,
g
φ′i
2 }∀i∈UA
〉
. It sends PP along with ξ and {ηi}UA to
the adversary A1 and keeps master secret MSK =〈
ψ, ζ, σ, κ, {φi}∀i∈UA
〉
in a secure place.
– PHASE 1 The following queries are issued by the
adversary A2:
Interactive protocol queries: Adversary A1 sends a
request along with the challenged identity IDj for the in-
teractive protocol parameters to the simulator B. Simulator
B chooses random numbers (u, rj , r
′′
j ) ∈ Z
∗3
q and then sets
hidj = H1(IDj). Afterwards, the simulator B computes the
interactive protocol parameters C
(hidj
+ u)/rj = g
a(hidj
+ u)/rj
2
and g
ζ·rj ·r
′′
j
1 . It then sends g
a(hidj
+ u)/rj
2 and g
ζ·rj ·r
′′
j
1 to the
adversary A2.
Trapdoor queries: Adversary A2 submits a keyword
wj ∈ W. Simulator B generates a trapdoor using the at-
tribute set Sj .
Simulator B computes hwj = H1(wj). It chooses ran-
dom numbers (x′j , x
′′′
j ) ∈ Z
∗2
q . The simulator B computes
trapdoor Trapj =
〈
{tr1ij , tr2ij}∀i∈Sj , tr3j , tr4j , tr5j , tr6j
〉
as follows:
tr1ij =
(
(Aσ ·Bφi)σ·x
′
j · (gηi1 )
ξ
)x′′j · gζ·xj ·x′′j1
= g
(σ′+φ′i)
σ′
a
·x′j ·x
′′
j +ξ·ηi·x
′′
j +ζ·xj ·x
′′
j
1
tr2ij =
(
(Dφi)
1
σ·x′
j
) 1
x′′
j = g
φ′i·a
σ′·x′
j
·x′′
j
2
tr3j = A
(hidj
+u)hwj
·x′′j ·x
′′′
j
σ = g
a·a(hidj
+u)(hwj
·x′′j ·x
′′′
j )
σ′
1
tr4j = A
ψ(hidj+u)x
′′
j ·x
′′′
j = g
ψ·a(hidj+u)x
′′
j ·x
′′′
j
1
tr5j = C
(hidj+u)x
′′
j · x
′′′
j /xj = g
a(hidj+u)x
′′
j · x
′′′
j /xj
2
tr6j = C
∏
i∈(UA\Sj)
(ηi + κ · hidj
)/x′′j = g
a
∏
i∈(UA\Sj)
(ηi + κ · hidj
)/x′′j
2
Finally, simulator B sends the Trapj to the adversary A2.
– CHALLENGE Adversary A2 sends two keywords w0
and w1, that he/she wishes to be challenged on. Af-
ter receiving the challenged keywords, the simulator B
flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}. It computes hwb =
H1(wb) and hidc = H1(IDc). It then generates a trapdoor
Trapcwb =
〈
{trc1i, tr
c
2i}∀i∈Sj , tr
c
3, tr
c
4, tr
c
5, tr
c
6
〉
as follows:
simulator chooses random numbers xc, x
′
c, x
′′
c ∈ Z
∗
q .
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TABLE 2: Computation Time (in Milliseconds) of Elementary Cryptographic Operations in MNT Curve
Exponentiation
Pairing
Group multiplication
Hash
G1 G2 GT G1 G2 GT
Commodity
Laptop PC
0.650 4.89 0.543 3.82 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.004
Workstation 0.437 3.376 0.389 2.665 0.003 0.001 0.0012 0.002
TABLE 3: NOTATIONS
Notation Description
|G1|, |G2|, |GT | size of an element in G1,G2 and GT respectively
|Z∗q | size of an element in Z
∗
q
TexpG1 , TexpG2 ,
TexpGT
computation cost of one exponentiation operation
on G1,G2 and GT elements respectively
Tp computation cost of a pairing operation
|UA| total number of attribute in the system
nor number of “OR” gates in an access policy
nt, nei number of attributes associated with a trapdoor and
encrypted index respectively
nr number of revoked attributes
nk total number of elements in all the keyword subsets
as defined in [26]
na total number of encrypted indexes associated with a
revoked attribute
nu total number of users associated with a revoked
attribute
Kc total number of keywords associated with an en-
crypted index
Ka total number of keywords associated with an access
structure as defined in [26]
tr1ij =
(
(Aσ ·Bφi)σ·x
′
c · (gηi1 )
ξ
)x′′c · gζ·xc·x′′c1
= g
(σ′+φ′i)
σ′
a
·x′c·x
′′
c+ξ·ηi·x
′′
c+ζ·xc·x
′′
c
1
tr2ij =
(
(Dφi)
1
σ·x′c
) 1
x′′c = g
φ′i·a
σ′·x′c·x
′′
c
2
tr3j = Z
(hidj
+u)hwb
·x′′c
σ = Z
a(hidj
+u)(hwb
·x′′c )
σ′
tr4j = Z
ψ(hidj+u)x
′′
c
tr5j = Z
(hidj+u)x
′′
c/xc
tr6j = C
∏
∀i∈(UA\Sj)
(ηi + κ · hidj
)/x′′c
= g
a
∏
∀i∈(UA\Sj)
(ηi + κ · hidj
)/x′′c
2
Afterwards, the simulator B sends the trapdoor Trapwb
to the adversary A2.
– PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1
– GUESS The adversary A2 guesses a bit b
′ and sends
to the simulator B. If b′ = b then the adversary A2 wins
IND-O-KGA game; otherwise it fails. If b′ = b, simulator B
answers “MXDH” in the game (i.e. outputs l = 0); otherwise
B answers “random” (i.e. outputs l = 1).
If Z = gr1 ; then Trap
c
wb
is completely random from
the view of the adversary A2. Therefore, the adversary A2
chooses b′ randomly. Hence, probability of the adversaryA2
for outputting b′ = b is 12 .
If Z = gab1 , then adversaryA2 receives a valid encrypted
index. The adversaryA2 knowing more than expected in the
IND-sCP-CKA game (random parameters being set by the
challenger to some predefined values), wins the IND-sCP-
CKA game with non-negligible advantage ǫ (according to
the Theorem 2). So, the probability of outputting b′ = b for
the adversaryA2 is
1
2+ǫ, where probability ǫ is for guessing
that the received trapdoor is valid and probability 12 is for
guessing whether the valid trapdoor Trapwb is related to w0
or w1.
Therefore, overall advantage AdvIND-O-KGAA2 of the simu-
lator B is 12 (
1
2 + ǫ+
1
2 )−
1
2 =
ǫ
2 .
7 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section presents a comprehensive performance analysis
of the proposed scheme, based on a detailed comparison
with most closely-related works [24], [25], [26] in terms of
functionality, storage and computation overhead. For this
purpose, we consider the same security level for the compu-
tation of cryptographic algorithms of all studied schemes.
The proposed scheme as well as two closely-related con-
structions Sun et al.’s scheme [24] and Hu et al.’s scheme [25]
are implemented using PBC library [58]. The elementary
cryptographic operations that are performed by the data
owners and users are implemented using a commodity
Laptop Computer having Ubuntu 17.10 (64-bit) operating
system and having 2.4GHz Core i3 processor with 4GB
memory. The elementary cryptographic operations that are
performed by VA and CSP are implemented using a work-
station having Ubuntu 17.10 (64-bit) operating system and
having 3.5 GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2637 v4 processor
with 16 GB memory. MNT curve with embedding degree 6
of 160-bit group order is used to implement the proposed
scheme which provides an equivalent 1024-bit discrete log
security. Table 2 shows computation time of the elementary
mathematical functions like exponentiation operations on
G1,G2,GT , pairing operation, group element multiplication
operations on G1,G2,GT , and hash operation in the chosen
MNT curve. From the implementation results of elemen-
tary mathematical functions, it has been observed that the
computation time of cryptographic operations like group
element multiplications and hash operation are negligible
compared with the other cryptographic operations.
The notations used in the following sections are intro-
duced in Table 3.
7.1 Functionality Comparison
Table 4 shows the functionality comparison of the proposed
scheme with most closely-related works [24], [26], and [25].
From Table 4, it can be observed that the proposed scheme,
[24] and [25] are based on CP-ABE, while [26] is based on
KP-ABE. It is to be noted that CP-ABE encryption mech-
anism is considered as more suitable than KP-ABE [10],
[24] for data sharing in a large distributed environment like
cloud environment, as it enables the Owners to choose the
access policies of their choice. In [26], an online trusted au-
thority issues trapdoors for the users. This is not a desirable
property as the user may have to contact the authority for
each search request. In addition, the authority chooses the
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TABLE 4: Functionality Comparison
ABE type Expressiveness
(gates)
SCF OKGA
resistant
Replay attack
resistant
CKS Revocation Pairing type
[24] CP-ABE AND No No No Yes Yes Symmetric
[26] KP-ABE AND, OR Yes Yes Yes Yes No Symmetric
[25] CP-ABE AND, OR No No No No No Symmetric
Proposed
scheme
CP-ABE AND, OR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Asymmetric
SCF: Secure-Channel Free; OKGA: Outsider’s Keyword Guessing Attacks; CKS: Conjunctive Keyword Search.
TABLE 5: Storage and Communication Overhead Comparison
CT size Trapdoor size Master secret size
[24] (1 + |UA|+ jKc)#|G1|+ |GT | |Z
∗
q |+ (1 + 2|UA|)|G1| (3|UA|+ 1)|Z
∗
q |
[26] (1 + 5Kc)|G1|+ |GT | (2 + 6Ka)|G1| 5|Z
∗
q |
[25] (2nei +Kc + 2)|G1| (2nt + 3)|G1| 3|Z∗q |
Proposed scheme Kc|G1|+ 2|G2|+ (nor + 1)|Z∗q | (nt + 2)|(G1|+ |G2|) (2|UA|+ 6)|Z
∗
q |+ |G2|
#1 ≤ j ≤ |UA|;
TABLE 6: Computation Complexity Comparison
Encryption Trapdoor Generation Search Revocation
[24] (Kc + |UA|)TexpG1 +
TexpGT
(1 + 2|UA|)TexpG1 TexpGT + (|UA|+ 1)Tp nr(nu +
na)TexpG1
[26] (7Kc + 1)TexpG1 +
TexpGT
(2 + 10Ka)TexpG1 + TexpGT + Tp ≤ (n1+1)TexpG1 +(6n1+1)Tp Not applicable
[25] (2nei +Kc + 3)TexpG1 (2nt + 4)TexpG1 (2nt + 3)Tp + ntTexpG1 Not applicable
Proposed scheme (nor+2Kc+1)TexpG1 +
2TexpG2 + (nor + 1)Tp
User: (nt + 3)TexpG1+
(nt + 2)TexpG2 + 2Tp;
CSP: TexpG1 + TexpG2
VA: [(nt + 2)TexpG1 + 2Tp]
#;
CSP: 3TexpG1 + 4Tp
nr · nu · TexpG2
# Computed only once per user request.
access policy that has to be integrated into the trapdoor.
Thus, only the authority has full control over the access
policies.
Access policy expressiveness is an important require-
ment. In the proposed scheme, Owner can choose a propo-
sitional formula which contains both boolean “AND” and
“OR” gates. Similarly, [26] and [25] also provide expressive-
ness in the access policies. However, access policies, in [24],
contain only “AND” gates.
Unlike [24] and [25], the proposed scheme does not need
any secure-channels between a user and CSP to transmit
trapdoors, which reduces overhead in the system. The pro-
posed scheme also prevents replay attacks and keyword
guessing attacks if an outsider adversary captures a trap-
door; while [24] and [25] are susceptible to both replay at-
tacks and keyword guessing attacks if an adversary captures
a trapdoor.
The proposed scheme, like [24], [26], provides conjunc-
tive keyword search without incurring additional overhead
in the system, which is desirable; while [25] does not pro-
vide conjunctive keyword search.
In the proposed scheme users are revoked in two ways:
by revoking a user completely from the system and by
revoking some attributes of the user. The former approach is
performed by removing the public key of the user from the
public bulletin board and the latter approach is performed
by updating witness of the users who possess the revoked
attributes. While, in [24], users are revoked per file by
removing his/her identity from a user list associated with
the file and also, it revokes attributes of a user by performing
re-encryption of the encrypted indexes associated with the
revoked attributes and updating secret keys of the non-
revoked users who possess the revoked attributes. It can
be observed that the re-encryption is a costly operation in
[24], as the revoked attributes can be associated with a large
number of encrypted indexes.
Finally, it is worth noting that the proposed scheme is
constructed using an asymmetric pairing function, while
most closely-related schemes rely on symmetric pairings.
It is believed that asymmetric pairing is a better choice for
designing a cryptographic scheme due to its better security
than symmetric pairings [59], [60]. Thus, it can be concluded
that the proposed scheme provides better security than [24],
[25] and [26].
7.2 Storage and Communication Overhead Compari-
son
In this section, we compare the proposed scheme with [24],
[25] and [26] schemes. The storage and communication
overhead are measured in terms of group element size, i.e.
|G1|, |G2|, |GT | and |Z
∗
q |.
Table 5 presents storage and communication overhead
incur due to an encrypted index (i.e. CT), a trapdoor, and
master secret key. From Table 5, it can be observed that the
size of the encrypted index of the proposed scheme depends
on OR gates in the access policy and the set of keywords
associated with the encrypted index. It can be concluded
that the encrypted index size in the proposed scheme is less
than [24] and [25], as the number of OR gates associated
with an encrypted index is smaller than the total number
of attributes in the system as in [24] and the number of
attributes associated with the encrypted index as in [25]. On
the other hand, the encrypted index size in [26] depends
on the number of keywords associated with the encrypted
index.
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Fig. 2: Comparison of computation time of the proposed scheme with Sun et al.’s scheme [24] and Hu et al.’s scheme [25].
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(a) Comparison between the proposed
scheme and Hu et al.’s scheme [25]
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(b) Comparison between the proposed
scheme and Sun et al.’s scheme [24]
Fig. 3: Comparison of computation time for the Search phase considering 1000 encrypted indexes
The trapdoor size of the proposed scheme depends on
the attributes associated with the trapdoor, like [25]; while
in [24], the trapdoor size depends on the total number of
attributes in the system which can be a large number. Thus,
we can conclude that the trapdoor generation mechanism of
the proposed scheme is better than [24]. On the other hand,
trapdoor size in [26] depends on the keywords associated
with the trapdoor, thus meaning that separate trapdoor per
keyword search has to be issued by AA, and AA has to
always remain online.
From Table 5, it can be seen that the size of the master
secret key of the proposed scheme is greater than [25] and
[26], while it is less than [24].
7.3 Computation Cost Comparison
In this section, the computation overhead of the proposed
scheme is compared with the closely related works [24], [25]
and [26]. First, we provide a comparison of the proposed
scheme with the related works [24], [25] and [26] in terms of
computation complexities. It is followed by the implemen-
tation results comparison of the proposed scheme with [24]
and [25]10.
10For the implementation, Cui et al.’s scheme [26] is not considered,
as it is designed using KP-ABE technique; while the proposed scheme
and [24], [25] are designed using CP-ABE technique.
7.3.1 Comparison of Computation Complexities
Table 6 presents a comparison of the computation com-
plexities of the proposed scheme with [24], [25] and [26]
in terms of exponentiation operations (i.e., TexpG1 , TexpG2 ,
TexpGT ) and pairing operation (i.e., Tp). It is to be noted that
the computation cost of group element multiplications and
hash operations are negligible compared with the pairing
and exponentiation operations according to the Table 2.
Therefore, we ignore them in the rest of the comparisons.
The computation cost, as depicted in Table 6, represents the
upper bound in the worst cases and incurs in Encryption,
Trapdoor Generation, Search and Revocation phases as detailed
hereafter.
The computational overhead during the Encryption
phase is incurred by the Owner who has to perform cryp-
tographic operations to generate an encrypted index. In the
Encryption phase of the proposed scheme, Owner encrypts
a set of keywords by computing (nor + 2Kc + 3) exponen-
tiation operations and (nor + 1) pairing operations. Thus,
it shows that the encryption cost of the proposed scheme
mainly depends on the number of both “OR” gates in the
access policy and keywords associated with an encrypted
index. The encryption cost of [24], [25] and [26] depends on
the number of keywords associated with an encrypted in-
dex, and also [24], [25] depend on the cardinal of attributes’
universe in the system as well as the number of attributes
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associated with an encrypted index respectively. It can be
observed that the number of “OR” gates in an encrypted
index (or access policy) is smaller than the number of
attributes associated with an access policy and the total
number of attributes in the system. Therefore, the Encryption
phase of the proposed scheme is less expensive than [24] and
[25].
The computational overhead during the Trapdoor Gen-
eration phase is mainly incurred by the User who has to
perform cryptographic operations to generate a trapdoor
using his/her secrets and the desired keywords. In the
Trapdoor Generation phase, the proposed scheme uses an
interactive protocol between a user and the CSP to generate
a trapdoor. Due to the interactive protocol, in the proposed
scheme, the CSP computes two exponentiation operations,
while the user computes one exponentiation and two pair-
ing operations in addition to the 2nt + 4 exponentiation
operations for computing the actual trapdoor. From the
table, it can be observed that the trapdoor generation cost
of the proposed scheme is lower than [24] as nt < |UA|.
On the other hand, the trapdoor generation cost in [26]
depends on the number of keywords associated with the
access structure. However, in [26], AA chooses the access
structure based on the keywords to be searched, which is
not desirable as mentioned earlier.
The computational overhead during the Search phase is
mainly incurred by the CSP and VA who has to perform
cryptographic operations during keyword search opera-
tion over the encrypted indexes. In the Search phase of
the proposed scheme, VA first performs attribute witness
verification procedure which takes (nt + 2) exponentiation
and 2 pairing operations. Note that these operations are
performed by the VA only once per keyword search request
from a user. If the user successfully passes the attribute ver-
ification phase, CSP performs keyword search by executing
3 exponentiation and 4 pairing operations per encrypted
index, which substantially reduces search time compared
with [24], [25] and [26].
For the attributes revocation of a user, the proposed
scheme requires to compute one exponentiation operation
per revoked attribute. This exponentiation operation is re-
quired to update the attribute witness associated with each
user who possesses the revoked attribute. While revoking
attributes of a user, in [24], one exponentiation operation per
revoked attribute is required to update secret keys of each
non-revoked user who possesses the revoked attribute and
another one exponentiation operation per revoked attribute
is required to re-encrypt the encrypted indexes associated
with the revoked attribute. Thus, the attribute revocation
operation in [24] requires more exponentiation operations
compared with the proposed scheme, as the number of re-
encrypted indexes can be large.
7.3.2 Comparison of the Implementation Results
Figure 2a shows the encryption time comparison of the
proposed scheme with [24], and [25], where we consider
fixed 5-keywords associated with an encrypted index (i.e.
Kc = 5). The computation cost of the encryption process
in the proposed scheme mainly depends on the number of
“OR” gates associated with access policy; while [24] and [25]
depend on the total number of attributes in the system and
the number of attributes associated with the access policy
respectively. As the number of “OR” gates (i.e., nor) can be
a smaller number than the total number of attributes in the
system (i.e., |UA|) and the number of attributes associated
with the access policy (i.e., nei), the proposed scheme takes
less computation time compared with [24] and [25] which
can be observed from the Figure 2a. In [24], cost of the
trapdoor generation process depends on the total number
of attributes in the system; while the cost of the trapdoor
generation process in the proposed scheme depends on the
number of attributes associated with the trapdoor, i.e. nt. As
the number of attributes associated with the trapdoor can
be smaller than the total number of attributes in the system,
the proposed scheme takes less computation time during
trapdoor generation process which can be observed from
Figure 2b. However, the trapdoor generation with [25] is
less computation demanding than the proposed scheme due
to less secure but more computationally efficient symmetric
pairing.
Figure 3a and Figure 3b show comparisons of the pro-
cessing cost required to perform a search operation over
1000 encrypted indexes between the [25], [24], and the pro-
posed scheme respectively. From the Figure 3a and Figure
3b, it can be seen that the search time of the proposed
scheme is substantially less than in [25] and [24]. This due to
the fact that in the proposed scheme, for each search request
the VA computes (nt+2)TexpG1 +2Tp operations only once
per search request and other 3TexpG1 + 4Tp operations are
performed per encrypted index; while [24] and [25] need to
perform TexpGT + (|UA|+1)Tp and (2nei +3)Tp + neiTexpG1
number of operations per encrypted index respectively
which are computing more exponentiation and pairing op-
erations than the proposed scheme.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, a fine-grained authorized expressive keyword
search scheme has been proposed. The proposed scheme
uses the benefits of CP-ABE to perform efficient keyword
search over encrypted data and for authorizing users. In
addition, it uses an interactive protocol for users to send
trapdoors to the CSP, thus avoiding construction of secure-
channels. Further, it uses a bilinear-map accumulator for
providing efficient user revocation, thereby avoiding the
cumbersome re-encryption operations over the encrypted
data. Conjunctive keyword search functionality is added
by the proposed scheme at no extra overhead. The security
analysis is performed under standard complexity assump-
tions and it shows that the proposed scheme is semantically
secure against the chosen keyword attack. The scheme is
also resistant against keyword guessing attacks. Moreover,
the performance analysis of the proposed scheme shows
that it outperforms the closely-related works in terms of
storage, communication overhead, and computational over-
head.
Security, efficiency, and query expressiveness are the
three main factors that define the practical usability of a
keyword search scheme [4]. A user expects that the keyword
search scheme provides strong security and high efficiency
(in terms of computation and communication costs), as high
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as for normal plaintext search. Further, the query expressive-
ness will provide the user to make different types of queries.
In this paper, we have made an effort to maintain a balance
among these three factors. We believe that there is still much
work to do for improving the balance among these three
factors, i.e., security, efficiency, and query expressiveness.
This will lead to the use of the keyword search schemes in
privacy-preserving personalized services over the Internet
like online advertisements or news.
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